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Volatile farm production
A second impediment to the development of a
private secondary market in farm mortgage loans
has been the relatively high delinquency and
default rates on these loans in recent years. The
chart provides evidence on the default rates on
farm and non-farm mortgages held by life insur-
ance companies in recent years. As can be easily
seen, the rate of default on farm mortgages has
exceeded that of non-farm mortgages.
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Credit enhancement mechanisms
In general, loan-backed securities require some
form of credit enhancement to be marketable. In
the case of privately securitized loans, the issuers
of the derivative securities rely on one or more
mechanisms to provide credit enhancement.
Life Insurance Companies' Mortgage Loans









associated with farm mortgage-backed securities
and the problems Farmer Mac faces in attempt-
ing to foster the development of a secondary
market in these assets.
This Letter examines the nature of the risks
The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 sought
to encourage the development of a secondary
market in farm mortgages by creating the Federal
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or "Farmer
Mac." Prior to the passage of this Act, a second-
ary market of this nature had not developed,
largely because investors have found the risks
associated with farm mortgages difficult to
assess. In an effort to overcome this problem, the
Act authorized Farmer Mac to guarantee repay-
ment of interest and principal on privately-issued
securities backed by farm mortgages. Without
this credit enhancement, many argue, it is
unlikely that a viable secondary market for
farm mortgage-backed securities would develop.
Two loans in one
Two aspects of farm mortgage loans make them
difficult to "securitize" and sell to investors.
First, unlike residential mortgage loans, farm
mortgage loans often contain a production loan
component and therefore are a hybrid of a
mortgage loan collateralized by farm land and
a commercial loan. As such, these loans often
contain a revolving credit facility that enables
the borrower to vary the amount borrowed over
the term of the loan. Consequently, prepayments
are more likely with farm mortgage loans than
with a typical mortgage loan.
A borrower's ability to repay a loan depends to a
large extent on the stability of his or her income.
Given that the value of farm production is highly
volatile, agricultural borrowers' incomes are
likely to be more volatile than average. As a
result, farm mortgage loans require substantially
more borrower-specific information and more
careful monitoring than do other kinds of mort-
gage loans. For these reasons, investors have
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establishment of a secondary market in securities cultural loans have tended to be held in the
since it is difficult for the securities issuer and original lenders' portfolios.
investors to judge what the payment stream will
look like. Thus, securities that are otherwise
similar in terms of their coupon and maturity
structures will be unique in terms of the risks
they pose to investors. This limits the potential
breadth of the secondary market for these
securities.FABSF
These include third-party guarantees (usually
in the form of letters of credit), reserve funds,
and/or subordinations. The objective with each
ofthese is to provide credit enhancement to a
sufficient level that credit risk will not be of
primary concern when investors evaluate a
given loan-backed investment.
As the name implies, reserve funds are funds set
aside at the time the securities are issued for the
designated purpose of covering any losses due to
delinquency and default on the underlying loans.
Subordination mechanisms frequently are used
instead of reserve funds to reduce the initial
investment required when issuing securities.
With subordination, senior and subordinated
interests in a single collateral pool are sold. The
level of subordination is set such that under a
worst-case scenario, the senior security holders
will receive promised payments. For example, a
10 percent level of subordination implies that the
pool could lose 10 percent of its value before the
senior securities would experience any losses.
As a result of this structure, the senior securities
often receive an investment grade rating and
carry a lower yield than the more risky subordi-
nated debt, which is extremely sensitive to the
delinquency and default rate on the pool.
A major concern to both issuers of and investors
in loan-backed securities is how much credit
enhancement is necessary. If the credit enhance-
ment provided is inadequate, investors will find
the securities unattractive. On the other hand,
more-than-adequate credit enhancement is
costly to the issuer.
For most types of loan-backed securities, the
risk characteristics of the underlying loans are
sufficiently well understood that an "adequate"
level of credit enhancement can be readily
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however, the credit risk apparently has been so
uncertain or so great that private credit enhance-
ment mechanisms have been inadequate, and
the absence of an additional guarantee has stood
in the way of the development of a secondary
market.
Enter Farmer Mac
For this reason, Congress created Farmer Mac.
Farmer Mac is a private corporation, owned by
shareholders, that will provide a guarantee of
timely payment of principal and interest to inves-
tors in farm mortgage-backed securities issued by
other parties. It is hoped that Farmer Mac's credit
enhancement will generate profitable opportuni-
ties for securities issuers, so that we will see the
development of a secondary market in farm
mortgages.
To obtain Farmer Mac's guarantee, the issuers
of farm mortgage-backed securities must pay
Farmer Mac an initial fee and an annual fee
based on the size of the issue. An additional
requirement is that the security issuer commit to
cover at least 10 percent of any losses that occur
as a result of delinquencies and default on the
underlying loans. This requirement can be met
by setting up either a reserve fund or a subor-
dination mechanism. Farmer Mac will cover
losses that exceed the issuer's reserve.
!n this way, Farmer Mac will provide a second
level of protection for the senior investor after the
reserve or subordination has been exhausted. To
the senior investor, the security will look like a
senior security of a senior/subordinated issue
with an additional guarantee by a federal agency.
To the issuer and investors in the reserve or sub-
ordination, the risk/return characteristics of the
issue will approximate those of a subordinated
interest in any mortgage pass-through.
In addition to the guarantee fees it receives
from issuers of farm mortgage-backed securities,
Farmer Mac will be able to draw on a back-up
line of credit with the u.s. Treasury as a source of
credit enhancement. Thus, if fee income is insuf-
ficient to cover losses at any given time, Farmer
Mac will be able to turn to the government for
funds to honor its guarantee of timely payment
of principal and interest to securities holders. As
a result, the credit risk to the investors in the
securities Farmer Mac guarantees will be
--ne-giigiole.---------------
To limit the size of the government's potential
obligation, the Act limits the volume of securities
that can be guaranteed in the first three years
of operations to two, four, and eight percent,
respectively, of the total outstanding supply of
non-FmHA agricultural mortgage loans. Given
the total supply of farm mortgages outstanding
at the end of 1987, this would suggest that at a
maximum the total dollar amount of farm mort-
gages that could be securitized with FarmerMac's guarantee in the first three years would be
1V2, three, and six billion dollars, respectively.
However, the guidelines on individual loans
and loan pools suggest that the total amount
securitized in this initial period will be less
than the maximum limits.
Underwriting and eligibility standards
Farmer Mac must establish underwriting stan-
dards for the loans that qualify to be securitized
and establish eligibility standards for loan orig-
inators and those involved in creating the loan
pools. The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987
provides certain guidelines.
These guidelines will help to ensure that a
certain degree of diversification is present in
the pools of loans guaranteed by Farmer Mac
and will thus help to reduce the pools' overall
risk. For example, mortgages must vary in princi-
pal amount, and no loan can exceed 3.5 percent
of the value of the pool. The land mortgaged
must be geographically dispersed and must
produce a variety of commodities. A pool must
contain at least fifty loans with no two from the
same borrower.
Other guidelines on individual loans and loan
pools that qualify to receive the Farmer Mac
guarantee also are designed to limit the risk of
each security. For example, the individual loan
characteristics must be within certain parameters
to qualify. Also, loan-to-value ratios must be 80
percent or less, and the loan amount cannot
exceed $2.5 million or be secured by more than
1000 acres. Loans as small as $50,000 cannot be
deliberately excluded from the pool and certain
single family mortgage loans may be included.
Other restrictions relate to borrowers' rights,
servicing standards, usury laws, and evidence
of farming expertise.
The problems
In addition to the underwriting guidelines and
eligibility standards, Farmer Mac also must set
the level of subordination (or reserve fund) and
the fee structure. Together, these parameters
should be set so as to ensure that Farmer Mac
does not experience losses under its guarantee
program.
The greatest difficulty will be in determining
what can reasonably be expected to be the
delinquency and default rates for farm mortgages
over the life of the Farmer Mac guarantee. More-
over, since the guarantee provides for timely
payment of principal and interest, any delays
in mortgage payments, even when payment
ultimately is made, could result in losses to
Farmer Mac.
In determining the appropriate level of fees
and subordination, Farmer Mac will have to over-
come credit risk assessment problems that have
inhibited the establishment of a secondary mar-
ket in farm mortgages in the past. Farmer Mac's
operation on a national scale may enable it to
take advantage of diversification opportunities
that are not available to non-government entities.
Only in this way will Farmer Mac be able to in-
crease the liquidity of farm credit markets, while
avoiding losses to the government.
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